Abstract Sen's classic social choice result supposedly demonstrates a conflict between Pareto and minimal forms of liberalism. By providing the first direct mathematical proof of this seminal result, we underscore a significantly different interpretation: rather than conflicts among rights, Sen's result occurs because the liberalism assumption negates the requirement that voters have transitive preferences. This explanation enriches interpretations of Sen's conclusion by introducing radically new kinds of societal conflicts, by suggesting ways to sidestep these difficulties, and by providing insight into other approaches that have been used to avoid the difficulties.
Introduction
Problems central to decision and social choice theory were aptly characterized with Amartya Sen's comment (in his 1998 Nobel Prize lecture, also see Sen 1999) that a camel is a horse designed by a committee [because] a committee that tries to reflect the diverse wishes of its different members in designing a horse could very easily end up with something far less congruous, half a horse and half something else-a mercurial creation combining savagery with confusion.
Expanding on his quote, a valued choice theory objective is to discover societal decision rules that avoid creating camels when horses are intended. Sen, a leader Our thanks to two referees for excellent suggestions. Saari's research was supported by NSF grants DMI 0233798, 0640817, and DMS 0631362. in identifying subtle barriers that frustrate this objective, discovered a fundamental difficulty in his 1970 "Impossibility of a Paretian Liberal" (Sen 1970a (Sen ,b, 1976 (Sen , 1983 (Sen , 1992 . By demonstrating that it is impossible to satisfy even a surprisingly minimal aspect of liberalism when combined with the Pareto condition, Sen's Theorem appears to identify a fundamental conflict between standard notions of rights, an assertion that has spawned an extensive literature. In fact, his result is much wider reaching as it captures central concerns across disciplines. To indicate this universality, we introduce Sen's Theorem with an example of an academic department hiring a faculty member.
A traditional way to analyze impossibility results from choice theory, such as Sen's Theorem, is to modify the basic assumptions or impose profile restrictions until a positive conclusion emerges. Influential examples include Blau (1975); Breyer (1977) ; Breyer and Gigliotti (1980); Campbell and Kelly (1997); Harel and Nitzan (1987) and Seidl (1975 Seidl ( , 1990 ) among many others. To more fully explore these results and the ongoing discussion of Sen's result, it is necessary to go beyond knowing that Sen's assumptions create a conflict to understand why they conflict. By doing so, we obtain the first general, direct proof of Sen's assertion. 1 Interesting corollaries follow from our proof. For instance, knowing why Sen's theorem occurs enriches his seminal conclusion by identifying new, surprisingly different interpretations. Our proof shows that in order to successfully sidestep Sen's fundamental difficulties, the intensity of other agents' ordinal preferences must be considered. Notice how this comment differs from traditional approaches where by treating an individual's choices as personal and private, it becomes irrelevant what others think. Also, by exhibiting the structure of Sen's result, our proof sheds light on some of the clever ways others have proposed to avoid Sen's conclusions. Then, by cataloguing all possible supporting profiles for a specified Sen outcome, the proof provides a template to explain the profile restrictions that are described in the literature and to even compare the likelihood of cycles created by Sen's conditions with that of cycles coming from majority votes.
Sen's Theorem
To indicate how Sen's result extends beyond individual rights, suppose a two-member search committee is charged with hiring one of Amy, Bill, or Cindy. 2 Assume that
